Scope: This is a filings test on one deal: J.Crew Group, Inc. after affiliates of TPG Capital and Leonard Green & Partners took it private on March 7, 2011. Every number comes from J.Crew’s own SEC filings, linked at the bottom. Nobody is graded, and this is not a profile of any executive or either sponsor. J.Crew’s fiscal year ends on the Saturday closest to January 31, so “fiscal 2010” means the year ended January 29, 2011, the last full year before the close. Dollar figures are in millions of U.S. dollars unless marked otherwise.
Every buyout comes with a story about the first 100 days. The new owners arrive, the plan gets rewritten, the advisers move in, and something gets fixed. Outsiders almost never get to check that story. The best you usually get is a stack of filings that were written for lenders, not for you.
So use them for what they are good for. A company that takes on public bonds after a buyout still has to file, and those filings will tell you exactly what the new capital structure costs and what the business looked like going into it. They will not tell you what anyone decided on day 30.
The question: after a take-private, what can the first public filings actually show about leverage, cash interest, capital spending and comparable sales, and what can they not show about “the first 100 days”?
Short answer: J.Crew went from zero debt to $1,600 million of debt overnight. Interest expense went from $3.9 million in fiscal 2010 to $101.3 million on a full-year pro forma basis, and operating income went from covering interest about 55 times to about 1.8 times. Cash interest actually paid went from $1.1 million in fiscal 2010 to $99.2 million in fiscal 2012. Capital spending went up, not down. The sales slowdown that showed up right after the close had started two quarters before the deal was even signed. And the first post-close financial statements, an eight-week stub inside a June 2011 bond registration, show almost no cash interest at all, because the first bond coupon wasn’t due until September.
The Timeline the Filings Give You
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Nov 23, 2010 | Merger agreement signed | FY2011 10-K, exhibit index |
| Mar 1, 2011 | Stockholders approve the deal at $43.50 per share in cash | 8-K Ex. 99.1 |
| Mar 7, 2011 | Deal closes; term loan, notes and revolver signed the same day | 8-K, Mar 10, 2011 |
| Mar 21, 2011 | 10-K for fiscal 2010 (the pre-close year) filed | FY2010 10-K |
| Jun 15, 2011 | Day 100 after the close (my count) | Calculation |
| Jun 22, 2011 | S-4 bond exchange registration filed, with stub-period statements for Jan 30–Mar 7 and Mar 8–Apr 30, 2011 | S-4 |
| Dec 1, 2011 | First post-close 10-Q (third quarter, ended Oct 29, 2011) | Q3 10-Q |
| Mar 19, 2012 | First post-close 10-K (fiscal 2011) | FY2011 10-K |
| Mar 20, 2013 | 10-K for fiscal 2012 | FY2012 10-K |
[Fact] There is no first- or second-quarter 10-Q for fiscal 2011 after the close. The S-4 was filed 107 days after the close, and its post-close statements cover 54 days, March 8 to April 30, 2011. That is the closest thing to a “first 100 days” report the public record contains, and it stops on day 54.
Step 1: The New Capital Structure
[Fact] At January 29, 2011, five weeks before the close, J.Crew reported total debt of zero, $381.4 million of cash and total assets of $860.2 million. The deal was funded with:
- [Fact] A $1,200 million senior secured term loan: seven-year maturity, quarterly principal payments of $3.0 million (0.25% of the original amount), interest at LIBOR plus 3.50% with a 1.25% LIBOR floor (step-down to 3.25% tied to leverage), and a required prepayment of up to 50% of annual excess cash flow.
- [Fact] $400 million of 8.125% senior notes due March 1, 2019, interest paid semi-annually on March 1 and September 1, starting September 1, 2011.
- [Fact] A $250 million asset-based revolving credit facility, undrawn at closing.
- [Fact] $1,225.9 million of equity contributions and $307.2 million of J.Crew’s own cash.
[Fact] Those sources paid a $2,981.4 million equity purchase price and $151.6 million of transaction costs. [Inference] By my arithmetic, debt was 51.1% of total sources, equity 39.1% and the company’s own cash 9.8%. The S-4 says it plainly: [Company assertion] “After completing the Transactions, we are highly leveraged.”
[Fact] Purchase accounting reset the balance sheet. The allocation recorded $1,686.9 million of residual goodwill, an $885.3 million indefinite-lived J.Crew brand name, an $82.0 million Madewell brand name and smaller write-ups of property, inventory and favorable leases. Total assets went from $860.2 million to $3,573.5 million in one year. [Inference] That is about 4.2 times, while the store count rose only from 333 to 362. The jump is accounting, not expansion.
How leveraged, on a simple proxy?
| Period | Debt | Operating income + depreciation + intangible amortization | Debt ÷ proxy |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fiscal 2010 (pre-close), debt at close | 1,600 | 263.7 (283.7 excluding $20.0M of deal costs) | 6.1x (5.6x) |
| Pro forma fiscal 2011 | 1,594 | 260.0 | 6.1x |
| Fiscal 2012 | 1,579 | 335.9 | 4.7x |
My calculation from reported operating income, depreciation and intangible amortization. This is not the company’s covenant definition of EBITDA or leverage; it excludes lease amortization and share-based compensation, and it is shown only to size the step change.
[Inference] Whatever definition you prefer, the company went from no net debt to roughly six turns of operating cash earnings in a single day. The leverage multiple came down by fiscal 2012 because earnings rose, not because debt fell: total debt went from $1,600 million to $1,579 million, a reduction of $21 million in two years.
Step 2: What the Interest Bill Did
| FY2009 | FY2010 | Pro forma FY2011 | FY2012 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating income | 211.3 | 214.0 | 185.8 | 253.7 |
| Interest expense, net | 5.4 | 3.9 | 101.3 | 101.7 |
| Operating income ÷ interest | 39.2x | 54.7x | 1.83x | 2.49x |
| Interest actually paid (cash flow statement) | 2.1 | 1.1 | 56.0 (Mar 8, 2011–Jan 28, 2012) | 99.2 |
Sources: FY2011 and FY2012 10-Ks. Coverage ratios are my calculation. FY2012 had 53 weeks.
[Fact] The company put pro forma cash interest for fiscal 2011 at $91.7 million, at a weighted-average rate of 5.6%: $57.2 million on the term loan and $32.5 million on the notes, before $9.6 million of non-cash amortization of financing costs. A 0.125% rise in LIBOR above the floor would add $1.5 million a year.
[Inference] That $91.7 million equals about 4.9% of pro forma fiscal 2011 revenue and about 49% of pro forma operating income (43% if you add back the non-cash purchase-accounting charges). In fiscal 2012, interest actually paid was 39% of operating income. Before the deal, interest was a rounding error. After it, roughly two of every five dollars of operating profit went to lenders before tax, capex or working capital.
[Fact] Interest is tax-deductible, and income taxes paid fell from $87.2 million in fiscal 2010 to $74.1 million in fiscal 2012 even though fiscal 2012 operating income was higher. [Inference] The tax shield softened the hit. It did not offset it.
The stub hides the interest bill
[Fact] For the 54-day successor period from March 8 to April 30, 2011, the S-4 reports interest expense of $15.5 million: $8.7 million on the term loan, $4.9 million on the notes, $1.6 million of financing-cost amortization and $0.3 million of other. Interest actually paid in that period was $0.145 million.
[Inference] Annualize the cash-type interest in that stub and you get about $94 million, close to the company’s $91.7 million pro forma. But the cash statement for the same weeks shows almost none of it, because the term loan’s first quarterly cycle and the notes’ first coupon hadn’t come due. Anyone reading only the first post-close cash flow statement would have seen the debt on the balance sheet and none of its cash cost. By October 29, 2011, the successor period had paid $48.4 million of interest; for the full successor period through January 28, 2012, $56.0 million; and for fiscal 2012, $99.2 million.
Step 3: What the 54-Day Stub Actually Shows
| Jan 30–Mar 7, 2011 (predecessor) | Mar 8–Apr 30, 2011 (successor) | 13 weeks combined | 13 weeks ended May 1, 2010 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 133.2 | 276.2 | 409.4 | 413.9 |
| Operating income (loss) | (16.8) | (7.2) | (24.0) | 75.4 |
| Interest expense, net | 1.2 | 15.5 | 16.7 | 0.6 |
| Net income (loss) | (16.1) | (13.8) | (29.9) | 44.7 |
| Cash from operations | (102.6) | 10.1 | (92.5) | 38.7 |
Source: S-4 filed June 22, 2011. The S-4 itself notes that the combined column is a mathematical sum and is not a GAAP presentation. The FY2011 10-K later shows the predecessor stub’s operating cash flow as −$101.1 million.
[Fact] The combined quarter’s $24.0 million operating loss includes $85.2 million of acquisition-related items: $44.7 million of accelerated share-based compensation, $32.2 million of transaction costs, $7.1 million of purchase-accounting amortization and $1.2 million of sponsor monitoring fees. [Inference] Strip those out and operating income was about $61.2 million against $75.4 million a year earlier, a decline of about 19%.
[Fact] Comparable store sales fell 5.8% in the quarter and comparable company sales, which add direct sales and shipping fees, fell 2.8%. Gross margin fell from 49.0% to 44.3%: 250 basis points from merchandise margin “due to increased markdowns,” 130 basis points from buying and occupancy costs, and 90 basis points from purchase-accounting adjustments.
[Company assertion] “We continue to see a softening of the sales trend in both Stores and Direct, primarily in women’s apparel, which we expect to continue at least through the first half of fiscal 2011.”
[Inference] The stub does show something real: the business was weaker in its first post-close weeks, with markdowns doing most of the damage. What it can’t show is whether anything the new owners did caused that, because the word “continue” in the company’s own sentence points backward. That is the next test.
Step 4: Was the Slowdown Already Under Way Before the Deal?
This is the alternative hypothesis that matters most. If the business was already turning before the close, the first post-close numbers say more about the inheritance than about the new structure.
| Gross margin by quarter | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fiscal 2009 | 42.2% | 41.2% | 48.4% | 43.9% |
| Fiscal 2010 | 49.0% | 44.6% | 43.5% | 37.4% |
| Change | +674 bps | +337 bps | −493 bps | −649 bps |
| Revenue growth, FY2010 vs FY2009 | +19.7% | +14.0% | +3.7% | +2.4% |
My calculation from the quarterly revenue and gross profit in the FY2010 10-K, note 16.
- [Fact] Fourth-quarter fiscal 2010 net income was $4.0 million, against $40.4 million a year earlier. The company reported $20.0 million of acquisition-related costs for fiscal 2010, recorded in selling, general and administrative expense; the quarterly table doesn’t say which quarters carried them. Because they sit below gross profit, they don’t affect the gross margins above.
- [Fact] Cash from operations fell from $232.4 million in fiscal 2009 to $181.8 million in fiscal 2010, down about 22%.
- [Company assertion] The pre-close 10-K, covering the year ended January 29, 2011: “We saw a softening of the sales trend in both Stores and Direct, primarily in women’s apparel, in the second half of this year. We expect this trend to continue at least through the first quarter of fiscal 2011.”
[Inference] The turn came in the third quarter of fiscal 2010, the quarter that ended in late October 2010, before the November 23, 2010 merger agreement. The trend was turning, but it was turning down, not up. So the weak first post-close quarter can’t fairly be pinned on the new capital structure, and the alternative hypothesis in its “already improving” form fails. In its broader form, that the first post-close numbers mostly reflect what the buyers inherited, it holds up well.
Step 5: Separate the One-Offs From the Run-Rate
A buyout year is full of charges that will never recur and a few new costs that will recur every year. Mixing them up is the fastest way to misread the first annual report.
| Item | Amount | Recurs? |
|---|---|---|
| Transaction costs expensed by the pre-close company | 20.0 in FY2010 + 32.2 in Jan 30–Mar 7, 2011 | No |
| Transaction costs in sources and uses (includes a $35M sponsor transaction fee paid at closing) | 151.6 | No |
| Debt issuance costs (capitalized, then amortized) | 67.5 paid; about 9.6 a year amortized | Non-cash amortization recurs |
| Accelerated share-based compensation at closing | 44.7 | No |
| Inventory step-up flowing through cost of goods sold | 32.5 (non-cash) | No |
| Sponsor costs paid or reimbursed, charged to equity | 19.9 | No |
| Purchase-accounting amortization and depreciation of write-ups | 25.7 in pro forma FY2011 (non-cash) | Yes, non-cash |
| Sponsor monitoring fee: greater of 0.40% of revenue or $8M a year | 7.4 recorded Mar 8, 2011–Jan 28, 2012 | Yes, cash |
| Cash interest | 91.7 pro forma | Yes, cash |
| Scheduled term-loan principal | 12.0 a year | Yes, cash |
Sources: FY2010 10-K, FY2011 10-K (notes 3, 4 and 15; MD&A), S-4. [Inference] At fiscal 2012 revenue of $2,227.7 million, the monitoring-fee formula works out to about $8.9 million; that figure is my arithmetic from the disclosed formula, not a reported number.
[Fact] On the company’s own pro forma basis, fiscal 2011 operating income was $185.8 million, which includes $25.7 million of purchase accounting. Fiscal 2010 operating income of $214.0 million included $20.0 million of transaction costs. [Inference] Take both out and run-rate operating income went from about $234.0 million (13.6% of revenue) to about $211.5 million (11.4%), down 9.6%. That $211.5 million still carries the roughly $8 million sponsor fee, which is a real cash cost of the new ownership.
[Fact] The company’s gross-profit bridge for pro forma fiscal 2011 shows +$72.6 million from higher revenue and −$46.0 million from lower merchandise margin, with gross margin down 250 basis points on “increased markdowns.” Selling, general and administrative expense excluding purchase accounting fell from 30.9% to 30.1% of revenue.
[Inference] The run-rate decline in fiscal 2011 is a markdown story, not an overhead story. The filings show no cost-cutting surge after the close. The ratio of overhead to revenue improved slightly, and the operating damage came through gross margin.
This is the discipline from Chapter 2 of my book 10-Minute Transformation: when a one-time charge or an acquisition-accounting adjustment distorts a year, don’t judge that year in isolation. Take out the items you can identify and read the multi-year trend instead.
Step 6: Capex Went Up, Not Down
| FY2009 | FY2010 | FY2011 (both periods) | FY2012 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital expenditures | 44.7 | 52.4 | 95.6 | 132.0 |
| % of revenue | 2.8% | 3.0% | 5.2% | 5.9% |
| Of which new stores | 20.0 | 14.9 | 30.4 | 51.9 |
| Stores open at year-end | 321 | 333 | 362 | 401 |
[Fact] The S-4 planned fiscal 2011 capex at about $95 to $100 million; actual spending across both periods was $95.6 million. The FY2011 10-K planned fiscal 2012 capex at about $120 to $125 million, including $50 million for new stores and $27 million for information technology; actual spending was $132.0 million.
[Inference] The common assumption that a leveraged buyout starves the business of investment is not what these filings show. Capex rose 82% in the first post-close year and kept rising, and actual spending met or beat the company’s published plans. If the leverage squeezed anything, it wasn’t visible in reported capex during the first two years.
Step 7: Cash From Operations, Before and After Interest
| FY2009 | FY2010 | FY2011 (both periods) | FY2012 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash from operations | 232.4 | 181.8 | 145.2 | 194.2 |
| Less capex | (44.7) | (52.4) | (95.6) | (132.0) |
| Cash after capex | 187.6 | 129.4 | 49.6 | 62.2 |
| Add back interest paid | 2.1 | 1.1 | 56.0 | 99.2 |
| Cash after capex, before interest | 189.7 | 130.5 | 105.6 | 161.4 |
My calculation from the cash flow statements in the FY2011 and FY2012 10-Ks. FY2011 adds the successor (+$246.3M) and predecessor (−$101.1M) periods.
[Fact] Fiscal 2011 operating cash flow is distorted by deal-related tax items in both directions. The predecessor period shows $74.5 million of excess tax benefits from share-based awards settled at closing, which accounting rules move from operating to financing cash flow. The company also collected $64.7 million of refundable federal income taxes after carrying back deal-related losses, which lifted the successor period. [Inference] Add back the $74.5 million reclassification and fiscal 2011 operating cash flow would be about $219.7 million. Fiscal 2011 is the year to read least literally.
[Inference] Fiscal 2012 is the cleanest post-close year. Before interest, the business generated about $161 million of cash after capex, more than the $131 million in fiscal 2010. After interest it kept $62 million, less than half the fiscal 2010 figure. The operating engine was bigger in year two. The amount left over was smaller, and the difference was almost entirely the interest bill.
[Fact] In December 2012, J.Crew paid a one-time special dividend of $197.5 million to stockholders of record of its parent, from cash on hand, as permitted by an amendment to the term loan. Cash fell from $221.9 million at the end of fiscal 2011 to $68.4 million at the end of fiscal 2012. [Inference] Over the same two years, debt principal fell $21 million. The dividend was about 9.4 times the debt repaid. This describes where the cash went; the filings give no reason for the choice beyond what is quoted here, and none is assumed.
[Fact] On February 4, 2013, a term-loan amendment replaced the loans with $1,179 million of new term loans, cutting the LIBOR margin by 0.25% to 3.00% and the LIBOR floor by 0.25% to 1.00%.
Step 8: Comparable Sales After the Close
| Period | Comparable company sales | Comparable store sales |
|---|---|---|
| Fiscal 2008 | −0.2% | −4.0% |
| Fiscal 2009 | +3.9% | +4.1% |
| Fiscal 2010 | +6.7% | +4.0% |
| Q1 fiscal 2011 (combined) | −2.8% | −5.8% |
| Q3 fiscal 2011 | +5.4% | +1.5% |
| First nine months fiscal 2011 | +2.0% | −1.1% |
| Pro forma fiscal 2011 | +3.3% | +0.8% |
| Fiscal 2012 (53 weeks) | +12.6% | not reported in the 10-K |
Sources: FY2011 and FY2012 10-K selected financial data and MD&A; S-4 (Q1); Q3 10-Q. Comparable company sales include comparable stores, direct and shipping fees. The company says it began measuring comparable company sales in the first quarter of fiscal 2011, so earlier years in that column are as later restated. No second-quarter fiscal 2011 figure is filed separately, and none is estimated here.
[Fact] The FY2011 10-K says the 3.3% comparable company sales gain was “driven by an increase in sales of men’s apparel, specifically woven shirts, pants and knits.” The FY2012 10-K attributes the 20.1% revenue increase “primarily” to women’s apparel, “specifically sweaters, knits, and shirts,” and the 160-basis-point merchandise margin gain to “decreased markdowns.” Fiscal 2012 revenue included $20.9 million from the 53rd week.
[Inference] Sales recovered while the debt was in place. The worst comparable quarter in the record is the first post-close quarter, and the slide that produced it started before the deal. By the third quarter of fiscal 2011, comparable company sales were positive again, and fiscal 2012 was the strongest year in this table. The filings show the leverage didn’t stop a merchandise recovery. They don’t show that the buyout caused one.
What the Filings Cannot Show About “the First 100 Days”
- Decisions and their dates. No filing lists what the new board or management changed in March, April or May 2011. Markdowns, assortment, pricing, staffing and store plans show up only as results, months later.
- The plan. [Company assertion] The FY2011 10-K says successor-period revenue reflected “lower than planned Stores sales” and gross profit was hit by “higher than planned markdowns.” So there was a plan. It isn’t disclosed.
- Day 55 to day 100. The S-4 statements end on April 30, 2011. The next financial statements are the third-quarter 10-Q. Everything from May through July 2011 exists only inside a nine-month total.
- Cash debt service in the window. The stub’s cash statement shows $0.145 million of interest paid, because the coupons hadn’t come due. The early cash picture looks better than the cost of the structure.
- Who did what. Board composition changed at the close, and a management services agreement covers sponsor advisory services. Nothing in the filings ties a specific operating result to a specific person or adviser, and this piece doesn’t either.
Disconfirming Evidence
- [Fact] The sales and margin slowdown began in the third quarter of fiscal 2010, before the merger agreement. The weakest post-close numbers are at least partly inherited, so they can’t be read as a verdict on the new owners.
- [Fact] Capex rose from 3.0% of revenue in fiscal 2010 to 5.9% in fiscal 2012. The “leverage starves investment” reading doesn’t fit the first two years.
- [Fact] Operating income reached $253.7 million in fiscal 2012 (a 53-week year), above any pre-close year shown, and coverage improved from 1.83x to 2.49x. The structure was expensive, but these filings don’t show it under strain in the first two years.
- [Fact] Fiscal 2011 operating cash flow was moved around by $74.5 million of tax-benefit reclassification and $64.7 million of refundable taxes. Any conclusion built on fiscal 2011 cash flow alone is fragile.
- [Limit] There is no peer set here. Some of the fiscal 2010–2012 swing may reflect conditions shared with other apparel retailers, which this single-company test can’t separate.
Alternative explanation: The whole sequence, a slowdown in late 2010, a markdown-heavy first half of 2011 and a strong 2012, could be an ordinary fashion-cycle miss and recovery in women’s apparel that would have happened under public ownership too. [Inference] The filings are consistent with that. The one thing they show that a fashion cycle can’t explain is the cash cost of the structure: roughly $92 to $99 million a year of interest that didn’t exist before March 7, 2011.
Sensitivity: Interest as a share of operating income runs from 39% (fiscal 2012, cash paid) to 49% (pro forma fiscal 2011, reported operating income); excluding non-cash purchase accounting gives 43%. The leverage proxy runs from 5.6x to 6.1x at the close depending on whether pre-close deal costs are added back, and 4.7x by fiscal 2012. Cash after capex and interest in fiscal 2012 was less than half the fiscal 2010 figure under every one of those choices. The conclusion that the first-year operating decline came through markdowns rather than overhead also holds: overhead excluding purchase accounting fell as a share of revenue.
Reading Your Own First Post-Close Filings
- Price the structure first. Write down cash interest, scheduled principal and recurring sponsor fees as an annual number before you look at any operating result.
- Check the coupon calendar. A short stub can show the interest expense and almost none of the interest cash. Match the period to the payment dates.
- Look two quarters before signing. If the margin and sales trend turned before the deal was agreed, don’t credit or blame the new structure for the first post-close quarter.
- Strip one-offs both ways. Take out transaction costs, inventory step-ups and accelerated compensation, and keep the recurring new costs, such as monitoring fees and interest, in.
- Read capex against the plan. The filings disclose planned capex. Compare it with actual spending before assuming investment was cut.
- Follow the cash after interest. Debt paid down, dividends paid and cash balances tell you where the operating improvement went.
Other filings-first cases on this site: Xerox 2000–2003: Three Bridges Before You Call It a Turnaround separates financing relief from operating repair, Five Evidence Tests Before You Applaud a Turnaround: Kmart as the Negative Case tests where the cash came from, and J.C. Penney Fiscal 2012: A Market Slump, or a Company That Left Its Customers? runs the market-versus-company test.
Frequently Asked Questions
How much debt did J.Crew take on in the 2011 buyout?
$1,600 million at closing: a $1,200 million term loan and $400 million of 8.125% senior notes due 2019, plus an undrawn $250 million revolving credit facility. The company had no debt at January 29, 2011.
How much did J.Crew pay in interest after the buyout?
The company put pro forma cash interest for fiscal 2011 at $91.7 million. Interest actually paid was $56.0 million for March 8, 2011 to January 28, 2012 and $99.2 million in fiscal 2012, against $1.1 million in fiscal 2010.
Did J.Crew cut capital spending after the LBO?
No. Capex rose from $52.4 million in fiscal 2010 to $95.6 million in fiscal 2011 and $132.0 million in fiscal 2012, roughly in line with the company’s published plans.
Limits
This is a reconstruction from public filings, read from outside the company. The post-close stub covers 54 days, and there are no first- or second-quarter fiscal 2011 10-Qs. Combined predecessor-plus-successor figures are arithmetic sums, not GAAP presentations. Pro forma figures are the company’s own and assume the deal closed at the start of the year. The leverage proxy is my calculation and isn’t the covenant definition. Fiscal 2012 had 53 weeks. No peer comparison is included. Percentages and ratios are my calculations from the filed figures. Nobody is graded, and nothing here describes anyone’s motives or character. This is educational analysis, not investment advice.
Run the Test on Your Own Business
- Book Todd to speak: bring this filings-first way of separating capital structure from operating performance to your board or leadership team. toddhagopian.com/speaking
- Read the books: Stagnation Assassin, plus the forthcoming 10-Minute Transformation (Koehler Books, February 23, 2027). toddhagopian.com/book/
- Free tool: find out whether your business is an ATM or a money pit with the ATM Test Scorecard.
- Want to read 10-Minute Transformation before launch? Join the launch team.
Sources
- J.Crew Group, Inc., Form 8-K filed March 10, 2011 (Items 1.01, 2.03, 5.01: ABL facility, term loan facility and 8.125% senior notes terms; completion of the merger on March 7, 2011). SEC EDGAR; Exhibit 99.1, press release dated March 7, 2011 (sponsors, $43.50 per share, March 1, 2011 stockholder approval). SEC EDGAR
- J.Crew Group, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 29, 2011 (fiscal 2010 results, second-half softening statement, $20.0 million acquisition costs, quarterly financial information in note 16). SEC EDGAR
- J.Crew Group, Inc., Form S-4 filed June 22, 2011 (statements for January 30–March 7, 2011 and March 8–April 30, 2011; first-quarter fiscal 2011 combined discussion; interest expense and interest paid; acquisition-related items; note terms and payment dates; capex plan; “highly leveraged” statement). SEC EDGAR
- J.Crew Group, Inc., Form 10-Q for the quarter ended October 29, 2011 (third-quarter and nine-month comparable sales; interest paid year to date). SEC EDGAR
- J.Crew Group, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 28, 2012 (selected financial data; pro forma fiscal 2011 reconciliation; pro forma cash interest; gross profit and SG&A bridges; cash flows; sources and uses and purchase price allocation in note 3; sponsor fees in notes 4 and 15; term loan terms; merger agreement date in exhibit index). SEC EDGAR
- J.Crew Group, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended February 2, 2013 (fiscal 2012 results; comparable company sales; capex; cash flows and interest paid; special dividend; long-term debt; February 4, 2013 term loan amendment in note 20). SEC EDGAR
- Todd Hagopian, 10-Minute Transformation, Chapter 2, “The Three Velocity Metrics” (strip one-time and acquisition-accounting distortions and read the multi-year trend). Koehler Books, forthcoming February 23, 2027. Paraphrased, not quoted.
Calculations are mine, from the filed figures cited. Educational analysis only.
About the Author
Todd Hagopian is VP of Product Strategy and Marketing and a business transformation author, speaker, and executive. His research is available as SSRN preprints. He is the author of the Turnaround Code Trilogy: The Unfair Advantage, Stagnation Assassin, and 10-Minute Transformation (February 23, 2027). More about Stagnation Assassins: About.
