Scope: This is a market-versus-company test on one case: J.C. Penney in fiscal 2012, set against Macy’s, Kohl’s and Nordstrom over the same fiscal years. Every number comes from the four companies’ own SEC filings, linked at the bottom, plus one piece of contemporaneous news coverage for context. Nobody is graded, and this is not a profile of any executive. Fiscal years end in late January or early February, so “fiscal 2012” means the 53 weeks ended February 2, 2013. Dollar figures are in millions of U.S. dollars unless marked otherwise.
When sales fall, the first explanation in the boardroom is almost always the market. Consumers are cautious. The category is soft. Everybody is down. Sometimes that is true. The problem is that the explanation gets used whether or not it is true, and a board that accepts it without checking can lose a year it doesn’t have.
The question: if one company is shrinking, what do the filings show about whether the market or the company is the cause, and what evidence would it take to call it a slump instead?
Short answer: J.C. Penney’s comparable-store sales fell 25.2% in fiscal 2012. Over the same fiscal year, Macy’s comparable sales rose 3.7%, Kohl’s rose 0.3% and Nordstrom’s same-store sales rose 7.3%. All four companies count online sales in the measure and all four leave out the 53rd week. A gap of 25 to 33 points against three peers who measured the same thing over the same weeks is not a market slump. There was real softness in the moderate-price part of the market, and Penney was already weak before 2012. Neither comes close to explaining the size of the fall.
The Test: Same Measure, Same Weeks, Named Peers
[Editorial method] A downturn is a market problem if competitors who sell to similar customers fell by a similar amount over the same period, measured the same way. It is a company problem if the company fell far more than those peers did. The test has three parts: pick the peers before you look at the results, make sure the measure is defined the same way, and look at the years before the bad year so you don’t mistake an old trend for a new shock.
This follows a principle from Chapter 2 of my book 10-Minute Transformation: growth only means something relative to the market you compete in, and the comparison is only valid when the company and the comparator are measured over the same period with the same definition. Mismatched definitions give you mismatched conclusions.
The peers. [Editorial choice] Macy’s and Kohl’s are the two large U.S. department-store chains closest to Penney’s customer and footprint. Kohl’s is the closest match on price point. Nordstrom is more upscale and is included as a check on the top of the market, not as a like-for-like comparison.
Step 1: Are the Definitions Comparable?
- [Fact] J.C. Penney: comparable store sales “are presented on a 52-week basis and include sales from new and relocated stores that have been opened for 12 consecutive full fiscal months and Internet sales.” Stores closed for an extended period are excluded.
- [Fact] Macy’s: comparable sales are sales from stores in operation throughout both years “and all net Internet sales, adjusting for the 53rd week in 2012.”
- [Fact] Kohl’s: comparable store sales include stores open throughout both full years and E-Commerce, and fiscal 2012 compares the 52 weeks ended January 26, 2013 with the 52 weeks ended January 28, 2012.
- [Fact] Nordstrom: same-store sales include stores open at least one full year and the online store. The 53rd week is excluded.
[Inference] The definitions are close enough for this test. All four include online sales, and all four strip out the extra week that fiscal 2012 contained. Each company warns that its definition may differ from others, so small gaps of a point or two shouldn’t be over-read. A gap of 25 points isn’t a definitional artifact.
Step 2: The Fiscal 2012 Comparison
| Fiscal 2012 | Comparable sales | Online | Gross margin rate change |
|---|---|---|---|
| J.C. Penney | −25.2% | −33.0% | −470 bps (36.0% → 31.3%) |
| Kohl’s | +0.3% (stores −2.0%) | +41.8% (E-Commerce comparable) | about −190 bps (38.2% → 36.3%) |
| Macy’s | +3.7% | +41.0% (comparable basis) | about −10 bps (40.4% → 40.3%) |
| Nordstrom | +7.3% (full-line stores +3.9%) | +37% (Direct, same-store) | −13 bps (gross profit rate) |
Sources: each company’s fiscal 2012 Form 10-K. Kohl’s gross margin rates are my calculation from its reported gross margin and net sales; the others are as reported. Gross margin definitions differ across retailers (Nordstrom, for example, includes buying and occupancy costs), so compare the direction of change, not the level.
[Inference] Against the closest peer, Kohl’s, Penney’s comparable sales were 25.5 points worse. Against Macy’s, 28.9 points worse. Against Nordstrom’s full-line stores alone, 29.1 points worse. The online line is the clearest single signal: the three peers grew comparable online sales by 37% to 42% in the year Penney’s online sales fell 33%. A weak market doesn’t push customers off one retailer’s website while they flock to three others’.
[Fact] Penney’s own 10-K says all merchandise divisions and all geographic regions had comparable store sales declines in 2012, with the home division declining the most.
Step 3: Was It Store Closures, the Extra Week or the Catalog Exit?
A shrinking top line can come from closing stores or exiting businesses, which is a choice, not a lost customer. The filings rule that out here.
- [Fact] Total net sales fell $4,275 million, from $17,260 million to $12,985 million. Penney’s own bridge attributes −$4,303 million to comparable store sales (including Internet), +$163 million to the 53rd week, +$11 million to new stores net of closings and −$146 million to the exit from catalog outlet stores.
- [Fact] The department-store count went from 1,102 at the start of fiscal 2012 to 1,104 at the end. Gross selling space was 111.2 million square feet at the end of fiscal 2011 and 111.6 million at the end of fiscal 2012.
- [Fact] Sales per gross square foot fell from $154 to $116.
[Inference] The same stores, on roughly the same square footage, sold about a quarter less. The comparable-store line explains slightly more than the entire decline. This was not a smaller company by design. It was the same company with fewer sales through the same doors.
Step 4: Did It Get Worse or Better Through the Year?
| J.C. Penney comparable store sales | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fiscal 2011 | +3.8% | +1.5% | −1.6% | n/a here |
| Fiscal 2012 | −18.9% | −21.7% | −26.1% | −31.7% |
Sources: J.C. Penney Forms 10-Q for the first three quarters of fiscal 2012 (each shows the prior-year quarter) and the fourth-quarter 2012 earnings release filed as Exhibit 99 to Form 8-K. The fourth quarter of fiscal 2011 isn’t shown separately in the documents cited here.
[Inference] A market shock usually hits a sector together and then eases or stabilizes. Penney’s decline deepened every quarter of fiscal 2012 while its peers posted positive full-year comparable sales. A slump that gets worse for one company each quarter, while its competitors grow, is behaving like a company problem.
[Company assertion] In the second quarter, Penney said sales were also hurt by its decision “to significantly reduce its marketing activities in the latter half of the quarter, as we reconsidered our approach to pricing and marketing in time for back to school.”
Step 5: The Years Before. Was Penney Already Lagging?
| Comparable sales | FY2010 | FY2011 | FY2012 |
|---|---|---|---|
| J.C. Penney | +2.5% | +0.2% | −25.2% |
| Kohl’s | +4.4% | +0.5% | +0.3% |
| Macy’s | +4.6% | +5.3% | +3.7% |
| Nordstrom | +8.1% | +7.2% | +7.3% |
[Fact] Penney’s comparable sales also fell 8.5% in fiscal 2008 and 6.3% in fiscal 2009. Its gross margin rate had already fallen 320 basis points in fiscal 2011, from 39.2% to 36.0%, and its GAAP operating income went from $832 million in fiscal 2010 to a $2 million loss in fiscal 2011, which included $451 million of restructuring and management transition charges. Its third-quarter fiscal 2011 comparable sales were already negative, and that quarter ended October 29, 2011, before the CEO change took effect on November 1, 2011.
[Inference] This is where an honest test has to give some ground. Penney was not a healthy company that fell off a cliff. It was trailing Macy’s and Nordstrom in 2010 and 2011, and its margin was already eroding. Against Kohl’s, though, Penney was within a fraction of a point in fiscal 2011. The break against its closest peer came in fiscal 2012, and it was 25 points wide.
Step 6: The Case for “It’s the Market”
Here is the strongest evidence for a market explanation:
- [Fact] Kohl’s store-only comparable sales fell 2.0% in fiscal 2012, and its number of transactions fell 1.5%. Online growth carried its total comparable sales to +0.3%.
- [Fact] Kohl’s gross margin rate fell about 190 basis points, and its operating income fell from $2,158 million to $1,890 million, a 12.4% decline by my arithmetic.
- [Fact] Kohl’s 10-K says it raised prices in fall 2011 as it passed higher apparel costs on to customers, then cut prices in 2012, especially in the fourth quarter “as sales were below expectations.”
[Inference] So there was real pressure on moderate-price department stores in fiscal 2012: fewer store trips and squeezed margins. A board at Kohl’s would have been right to call part of its year a market problem. Penney, sitting in the same price band, faced the same headwind. But the headwind explains a couple of points of decline, not 25. The gross margin comparison says the same thing: Kohl’s lost about 190 basis points, while Penney lost 470.
Step 7: What the Company Itself Concluded
[Fact] Penney’s 10-K for fiscal 2012 breaks the 470-basis-point gross margin decline into higher margins on “everyday value” merchandise (+240 bps), lower margins on clearance combined with more clearance sales (−460 bps), lower margins on services including free haircuts and promotionally priced photography (−130 bps), markdowns and reserves tied to the new strategy (−70 bps) and reduced vendor cost concessions linked to the simplified pricing (−50 bps).
[Fact] Selling, general and administrative expense fell $603 million, or 11.8%, but rose from 29.6% to 34.7% of sales because sales fell faster. GAAP operating income went from a $2 million loss to a $1,310 million loss, and the company’s adjusted operating income went from $536 million to a $939 million loss. Free cash flow, as the company defines it, went from $23 million to −$906 million, and cash fell from $1,507 million to $930 million. The fiscal 2012 GAAP result also contains a $397 million net gain on the sale or redemption of non-operating assets, which makes the operating picture look less bad than it was.
[Company assertion] A year later, in its fiscal 2013 10-K, the company described its prior strategy as focused on everyday low prices, substantially eliminating promotions, a shops presentation and new brands, and stated: “These pricing and merchandising strategies did not resonate with our customers.” The board brought back the previous CEO in April 2013.
[Inference] By its own account, the company attributed the decline to its own strategy, not to the market. The filings support that conclusion. That doesn’t make the old model good. It had been losing ground for years. What it shows is that the 2012 fall was caused by the company’s own choices and was measurable as such within the first quarter.
Disconfirming Evidence
- [Fact] Penney was weak before fiscal 2012: comparable sales of −8.5% and −6.3% in fiscal 2008 and 2009, a 320-basis-point gross margin decline in fiscal 2011, and a negative third quarter in fiscal 2011 before the CEO change. Some of the 2012 decline may be an older trend speeding up, not a new break.
- [Fact] The moderate-price segment was soft. Kohl’s had negative store comparable sales, fewer transactions and a 12.4% drop in operating income.
- [Reported figure, The New York Times] In November 2012, the Times reported that Penney was producing $269 in sales per square foot in transformed store space versus $134 in older space. That figure covered only the converted space, about 11% of floor area at the time per the same report, and it doesn’t appear in the 10-K figures used here. It can’t offset a company-wide comparable decline, but it is the strongest piece of evidence that part of the new format was working.
- [Fact] After the strategy was reversed, comparable sales were still −7.4% in fiscal 2013. The company said they improved sequentially each quarter, with the fourth quarter delivering its first quarterly comparable gain since the second quarter of 2011.
Alternative explanation: fiscal 2012 could be read as a planned transition year, with lost promotional sales as the price of a new model that needed more time and more remodeled space to prove itself. [Inference] The filings can’t test that counterfactual, because the strategy was reversed in 2013. What they can test is whether the decline was market-wide, and it wasn’t. The recovery in fiscal 2013 after the reversal is also not proof that the original strategy “would never have worked.” All it shows is that the reversal coincided with a slower decline.
Sensitivity: drop Nordstrom as too upscale and compare only with Kohl’s, the closest price-point peer, and the gap is still 25.5 points. Use Kohl’s store-only comparable sales (−2.0%) to strip out its online growth, and the gap is still about 23 points. No reasonable choice of peer or definition gets the gap below 20 points.
How to Run This Test on Your Own Downturn
- Name the peers first. Pick two or three competitors who sell to the same customers before you look at the numbers. Add one adjacent player as a ceiling check.
- Match the measure. Same period, same definition, same treatment of online sales, extra weeks, closures and acquisitions. If you can’t match it, say so and widen your tolerance.
- Remove what you chose. Separate decline you caused on purpose, such as closures and exits, from decline on the same base.
- Look at the shape. Check the quarterly path. A market shock tends to hit a sector together. A company problem tends to diverge and deepen.
- Look back three years. Find out whether the gap is new or an old lag getting wider.
- Give the market its share. If peers fell a little, credit that much to the market, and own the rest.
The same evidence-first approach shows up in other cases on this site: Five Evidence Tests Before You Applaud a Turnaround: Kmart as the Negative Case, Starbucks’ Oct 29 Results: Traffic, Ticket, and the China Accounting Bridge and When the Growth Denominator Shrinks, Stop Trusting the Ratio.
Frequently Asked Questions
How much did J.C. Penney’s sales fall in 2012?
Total net sales fell 24.8%, from $17,260 million in fiscal 2011 to $12,985 million in fiscal 2012 (25.7% excluding the 53rd week). Comparable store sales, including online, fell 25.2%.
Did other department stores decline in 2012 too?
Not on comparable sales. Macy’s rose 3.7%, Kohl’s 0.3% and Nordstrom 7.3% in the same fiscal year. Kohl’s store-only comparable sales did fall 2.0%, so moderate-price stores faced some pressure, but nothing close to Penney’s decline.
How can you tell a market slump from a company problem?
Compare your decline with named competitors over the same period, using the same definition of the measure. If they fell about as much as you did, it’s mostly the market. If you fell far more, and the gap is widening, it’s mostly the company.
Limits
This is a reconstruction from public filings, read from outside the company. Comparable-sales definitions differ slightly across the four companies, and each warns that its measure may not match others’. Nordstrom is a higher-price retailer and is a ceiling check, not a like-for-like peer. Gross margin definitions differ across retailers, so only the direction of change is compared. The fourth quarter of fiscal 2011 for Penney is not broken out in the documents cited. Percentages and point gaps are my calculations from the filed figures. Nobody is graded, and nothing here describes anyone’s motives or character. This is educational analysis, not investment advice.
Run the Test on Your Own Business
- Book Todd to speak: bring this evidence-first way of separating market noise from company problems to your board or leadership team. toddhagopian.com/speaking
- Read the books: Stagnation Assassin, plus the forthcoming 10-Minute Transformation (Koehler Books, February 23, 2027). toddhagopian.com/book/
- Free tool: find out whether your business is an ATM or a money pit with the ATM Test Scorecard.
- Want to read 10-Minute Transformation before launch? Join the launch team.
Sources
- J. C. Penney Company, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended February 2, 2013: Five-Year Financial Summary (comparable store sales fiscal 2008–2012, operating income, adjusted operating income, free cash flow, cash); comparable store sales definition; net sales bridge; Internet sales; division and region comments; gross margin bridge; SG&A; quarterly results. SEC EDGAR
- J. C. Penney Company, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended February 1, 2014: description of prior strategy, CEO change in April 2013, fiscal 2013 comparable store sales and quarterly trend, Five-Year Operations Summary (store count, gross selling space, sales per gross square foot). SEC EDGAR
- J. C. Penney Company, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 28, 2012: CEO effective date November 1, 2011; fiscal 2011 restructuring and management transition charges. SEC EDGAR
- J. C. Penney Company, Inc., Forms 10-Q for the quarters ended April 28, 2012, July 28, 2012 and October 27, 2012 (quarterly comparable store sales, current and prior year; second-quarter marketing statement). Q1, Q2, Q3
- J. C. Penney Company, Inc., fourth-quarter and fiscal 2012 earnings release, Exhibit 99 to Form 8-K, February 2013 (fourth-quarter comparable store sales −31.7%). SEC EDGAR
- Macy’s, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended February 2, 2013 (comparable sales 2011–2012, definition, Internet contribution, gross margin). SEC EDGAR; Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 28, 2012 (fiscal 2010 comparable store sales). SEC EDGAR
- Kohl’s Corporation, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended February 2, 2013 (selected financial data, comparable store sales by stores and E-Commerce, drivers including transactions, pricing commentary, 53rd week). SEC EDGAR; Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 28, 2012 (fiscal 2010 comparable store sales). SEC EDGAR
- Nordstrom, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended February 2, 2013 (same-store sales by channel, definition, 53rd week, gross profit rate). SEC EDGAR; Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 28, 2012 (fiscal 2010 same-store sales). SEC EDGAR
- Andrew Ross Sorkin, “A Dose of Realism for the Chief of J.C. Penney,” The New York Times DealBook, November 12, 2012 (company-reported sales per square foot in remodeled shops; share of floor space converted). Context only. nytimes.com
- Todd Hagopian, 10-Minute Transformation, Chapter 2, “The Three Velocity Metrics” (growth relative to the market; same period and definition for company and comparator; read margin direction, not level; caution on one-time distortions). Koehler Books, forthcoming February 23, 2027. Paraphrased, not quoted.
Calculations are mine, from the filed figures cited. News coverage is context only, not a source of figures used in the comparison. Educational analysis only.
About the Author
Todd Hagopian is VP of Product Strategy and Marketing and a business transformation author, speaker, and executive. His research is available as SSRN preprints. He is the author of the Turnaround Code Trilogy: The Unfair Advantage, Stagnation Assassin, and 10-Minute Transformation (February 23, 2027). More about Stagnation Assassins: About.
