Five Evidence Tests Before You Applaud a Turnaround: Kmart as the Negative Case

Stagnation Slaughters. Strategy Saves. Speed Scales.

Scope: This is an evidence checklist tested on one negative case: Kmart from its May 2003 exit from Chapter 11 through fiscal 2007, when it was a segment of Sears Holdings. Every number comes from the companies’ own SEC filings, linked at the bottom, plus two pieces of contemporaneous news coverage for context. Nobody is graded. No executive’s motives are described. Fiscal years end in late January or early February, so “fiscal 2004” means the 52 weeks ended January 26, 2005. All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars unless marked otherwise.

In November 2004, Kmart reported third-quarter net income of $553 million against a loss a year earlier, and NBC News noted the stock had risen more than sevenfold from the $15 a share it traded at when the company left bankruptcy. Three months earlier, The New York Times described Kmart as “simultaneously losing ground with the American shopper and generating cash like a slot machine.”

Both descriptions were accurate. That is exactly the problem a board faces when somebody announces a turnaround. Profit, cash and the share price can all move up while the business underneath keeps shrinking. If you only check the headline numbers, you will applaud too early.

The question: which evidence separates a durable turnaround from a well-timed financial rebound?

Short answer: run five tests before you clap. Is the customer coming back relative to competitors? How much of the profit is operating profit rather than gains and accounting resets? Where did the cash actually come from? Is the business reinvesting enough to keep its assets competitive? And do the gains hold for at least two annual periods after the people and the circumstances change? Kmart’s fiscal 2004 passed the cash test on the surface and failed or came up mixed on the other four. Three years later, its operating income was less than half of its fiscal 2004 adjusted level.

[Editorial label] These five tests are my proposed checklist, built for this article. They are not a validated predictor, and they are not a named framework from my books. One negative case can show where a headline misleads. It cannot prove the tests work on every company.

The Headline: A Retailer That Lost Money for Years Suddenly Made $1.1 Billion

[Fact] Kmart Holding Corporation’s fiscal 2004 10-K reports net income of $1,106 million on sales of $19,701 million, operating income of $1,821 million (9.2% of sales) and year-end cash of $3,435 million. The predecessor company had lost $3,219 million in fiscal 2002 and $2,446 million in fiscal 2001.

[Fact] The same table shows comparable-store sales down 11.0% in fiscal 2004, after declines of 9.5% for the 39 weeks ended January 28, 2004, 3.2% for the 13 weeks before emergence and 10.1% in fiscal 2002. The store count fell from 2,114 at the end of fiscal 2001 to 1,480 at the end of fiscal 2004. On my arithmetic, that is a 30% smaller store base and 42% lower sales than fiscal 2001.

[Company assertion] Management said that on emergence it “sought to eliminate unprofitable sales, reduce excess inventory, and improve the customer experience,” and that every store had to produce a profitable plan for 2004. That matters. Part of the sales decline was intended, so a falling top line by itself is not proof of failure. The tests below ask whether the profit that replaced those sales was operating and durable.

Test 1: Is the Customer Coming Back, Relative to Competitors?

The first test is the one most turnaround announcements skip. Absolute growth mixes management skill with market conditions. My forthcoming book 10-Minute Transformation (Chapter 2) makes the same point about growth metrics in general: compare a business’s growth with its industry’s, because the same absolute number can mean share gain in one market and share loss in another. (Paraphrased, not quoted.)

Kmart’s own 10-K names its competitors: “competitors, such as Target and Wal-Mart, have continued to open new stores.” I used those two as the comparison set because the company chose them, not because of how their numbers came out. Two peers is a thin set, and both were growing chains, so treat this as directional.

Retailer, fiscal year ended ~Jan 2005 Sales growth Comparable-store sales
Kmart (fiscal 2004) Not comparable year over year (fresh-start accounting split fiscal 2003) −11.0%
Wal-Mart (fiscal 2005), U.S. Total company +11.3% +3.3% (U.S.)
Target (fiscal 2004) +11.6% Positive; cited as a growth driver, no percentage in the filed annual report text

[Fact] Kmart’s 10-K says it “experienced a decrease in market share in part due to store closings and the elimination of unprofitable sales,” and lists “Kmart’s ability to reverse its negative same-store sales trend” among its own risk factors. The fourth quarter of fiscal 2004 was better: same-store sales fell 4.5%, against declines of 12.8% and 14.9% in the two quarters before.

Verdict: fail. [Inference] A double-digit comparable decline while the two named competitors grew is share loss, not a rebound in customer demand. The improving fourth quarter is a real counter-signal, and it gets tested again in the durability panel below.

Test 2: How Much of the Profit Is Operating Profit?

The second test strips out what won’t recur. 10-Minute Transformation (Chapter 2) warns not to trust a single year distorted by a one-time item or an accounting adjustment, and to anchor on the multi-year trend instead. (Paraphrased.) Kmart’s fiscal 2004 had three such distortions.

1. Property sales. [Fact] Operating income included a $946 million net gain on sales of assets, “primarily related to the previously announced transactions with Home Depot and Sears.” Kmart itself reported adjusted operating income of $875 million, or 4.4% of sales, excluding the gain. On my arithmetic, the gain was 51.9% of reported operating income. The 10-K puts the after-tax gain at $579 million, which is 52.4% of net income.

2. A depreciation reset. [Fact] Fresh-start accounting on emergence wrote off long-lived assets, and depreciation fell with them. Depreciation and amortization was $69 million in fiscal 2004 (0.35% of sales), against $737 million (2.5% of sales) for the predecessor in fiscal 2002. For the first quarter of fiscal 2004, management quantified the effect: lower depreciation from the write-off added 54 basis points to the gross margin rate and cut SG&A by $86 million. [Inference] Lower depreciation isn’t cash. It’s an accounting consequence of writing the assets down, and it flatters operating margin until the company rebuilds its asset base and depreciation climbs back.

3. A restatement. [Fact] In February 2005, after an SEC review connected with the Sears merger filing, Kmart restated its fiscal 2003 results for the accounting on a convertible note issued at emergence. The restatement added $22 million of non-cash interest expense and cut 39-week net income from $248 million to $234 million. [Inference] The amount was small. The signal was that the reported earnings needed a regulator’s second look.

[Fact] The underlying operating improvement was real, though. Kmart attributed the gain in adjusted operating income to lower SG&A, including $263 million less store payroll and benefits and $69 million less circular advertising over the last 39 weeks of fiscal 2004, net of lower gross margin dollars. Over the same 39 weeks, the gross margin rate rose from 23.4% to 25.8%, which the company tied to better markon, fewer clearance markdowns and lower shrink.

Verdict: mixed. [Inference] A 4.4% adjusted operating margin, up from losses, was a genuine repair of the cost base. Half of the headline was not operating, and part of the remaining margin rested on a depreciation line that the write-down had temporarily shrunk.

Test 3: Where Did the Cash Come From?

Cash is the test that a rebound usually passes, so read the sources, not the balance.

Cash flow line 39 weeks to Jan 28, 2004 Fiscal 2004
Net cash from operating activities 736 1,068
of which: change in merchandise inventories +1,193 −57
of which: change in accounts payable −340 +272
of which: deferred income taxes (non-cash add-back) +137 +597
Proceeds from sales of assets 182 562
Capital expenditures (108) (230)
Year-end cash and equivalents 2,088 3,435

[Fact] Kmart’s MD&A says the first post-emergence period’s operating cash was “primarily driven by the reduction of merchandise inventories of $1.2 billion on a same-store basis.” For fiscal 2004, it says earnings excluding the after-tax asset-sale gains and bankruptcy items provided $490 million of operating cash, with the rest helped by working capital, “including incremental accounts payable due to improved terms with our vendors.” Of the $669 million tax provision in fiscal 2004, $597 million was deferred rather than paid in cash. And $584 million of the year-end cash, about 17%, was posted as collateral for letters of credit and self-insurance programs, though Kmart classified it as cash because it could swap that collateral at its discretion.

Verdict: passes on the surface, mixed underneath. [Inference] The cash was real and the company no longer needed its revolving credit line, which it terminated in January 2005. But the first year’s cash came mostly from selling down inventory, a one-time release. The second year’s cash leaned on vendor terms, a tax provision that wasn’t paid in cash, and property proceeds. Each of those is legitimate. None of them is evidence that customers were buying more.

Test 4: Is the Business Reinvesting Enough to Stay Competitive?

The fourth test asks whether today’s profit is borrowing from tomorrow. In Chapter 12 of 10-Minute Transformation, I describe the pattern of an operation that keeps optimizing the present at the expense of the future, and I argue the remedy is a test applied before each decision, with the rationale written down for the next operator. (Paraphrased.) Capital spending is the most visible place that trade-off shows up.

Retailer Capital expenditures, % of sales Depreciation and amortization, % of sales
Kmart fiscal 2004 1.2% (0.5% excluding $124M spent buying 31 leased properties) 0.35%
Kmart predecessor fiscal 2000 / 2001 3.1% / 4.1% n/a
Wal-Mart fiscal 2005 4.5% 1.5%
Target fiscal 2004 6.7% 2.8%

[Fact] Kmart’s 10-K says it spent $106 million on “necessary capital expenditures,” including $75 million for store and distribution-center additions or betterments, and that its store remodel program had been run “on a limited number of stores” so the results could be monitored. It also said it expected to keep losing share “due to its limited growth plans.”

Verdict: fail, with a caveat. [Inference] Much of Wal-Mart’s and Target’s spending funded new stores, which a shrinking chain wouldn’t need, so the peer gap overstates the shortfall. Even so, Kmart was spending roughly half a percent of sales on its existing stores while its customers were choosing better-invested competitors, and its own pre-bankruptcy spending had run at three to four percent of sales. Low capital spending raises cash in the short run. It can’t fix a store base customers are leaving.

Test 5: Do the Gains Hold After the Transition?

The last test is the one only time can run. Kmart merged with Sears on March 24, 2005, and reported as a segment of Sears Holdings from then on. Sears Holdings’ fiscal 2007 10-K gives three years of Kmart segment results.

Kmart FY2004 (standalone) FY2005 FY2006 FY2007
Sales 19,701 19,094 18,647 17,256
Comparable-store sales −11.0% −1.2% −0.6% −4.7%
Gross margin rate 25.5% 24.3% 24.6% 23.5%
Operating income 875 (adjusted, ex gain) 767 948 402
Operating margin 4.4% 4.0% 5.1% 2.3%
Stores at year-end 1,480 1,416 1,388 1,382

[Fact] The segment figures include smaller asset-sale gains ($40 million in 2005, $71 million in 2006, $1 million in 2007) and restructuring charges ($54 million in 2005, $9 million in 2006). Fiscal 2006 had 53 weeks, and fiscal 2005 included three extra days from a change in month-end. Segment reporting under Sears Holdings is not identical to Kmart’s standalone accounts, so the FY2004 column is a reference point, not a strict like-for-like comparison.

[Fact] Sears Holdings attributed the 2007 comparable decline to “an increasingly competitive retail environment, a decrease in consumer’s disposable income and the increased costs of consumer staples,” and said the gross margin rate fell 1.1 points on lower leverage of buying and occupancy costs plus markdowns.

Verdict: fail by year three. [Inference] The comparable decline narrowed sharply in 2005 and 2006, and 2006 operating income beat the fiscal 2004 adjusted figure. That’s the strongest evidence in Kmart’s favor. It didn’t hold: comparable sales never turned positive in the three years shown, and by fiscal 2007 operating income was 54% below the fiscal 2004 adjusted level on 12% lower sales.

Scorecard

Test What it asks Kmart 2003–2007
1. Customer, relative to peers Are comparable sales or share improving against named competitors? Fail
2. Earnings quality How much profit is operating, after gains, accounting resets and restatements? Mixed
3. Cash sources Is cash coming from operations, or from inventory release, vendors, taxes and asset sales? Passes on the surface, mixed underneath
4. Reinvestment Is capital spending enough to keep the assets competitive? Fail, with caveat
5. Durability Do the gains hold for at least two annual periods after the transition? Fail by fiscal 2007

No overall grade is assigned. This is a test of the checklist, not a CEO review, and the leadership, ownership and corporate structure changed during the window.

Disconfirming Evidence

  • [Fact] Kmart left bankruptcy, ended fiscal 2004 without needing its revolving credit line (which it had only used to back letters of credit, and terminated in January 2005), built a large cash balance and turned years of losses into positive adjusted operating income. For a creditor, or for an owner who valued the company on cash and real estate, that was a real recovery.
  • [Company assertion] Management said it chose to give up unprofitable sales. Some of the comparable decline was a deliberate cut in promotions and circular advertising, not lost customers alone.
  • [Fact] Comparable sales improved from −11.0% (fiscal 2004) to −0.6% (fiscal 2006), and fiscal 2006 segment operating income of $948 million exceeded fiscal 2004’s adjusted $875 million.
  • [Fact] In fiscal 2007, Sears Domestic’s comparable sales also fell, by 4.0%, so part of Kmart’s decline was a sector-wide and economy-wide slowdown, not only a Kmart problem.

Alternative explanation: Kmart in this period can be read as a deliberate harvest, maximizing cash and real-estate value from a declining format rather than trying to rebuild it. Under that reading, low reinvestment and shrinking sales were the strategy, and the right test is cash returned versus asset value, not customer recovery. [Inference] That reading is consistent with the filings, and it doesn’t rescue the turnaround claim. A harvest isn’t a turnaround, and a board should know which one it’s applauding.

Sensitivity: judged on fiscal 2006 alone, Kmart looks close to stabilized, with near-flat comparable sales and a 5.1% segment margin. Judged on fiscal 2004 reported net income, it looks like a spectacular recovery. Only the multi-year view, plus the gain and depreciation adjustments, shows the pattern. That’s the argument for running all five tests across at least three years instead of reading any one year in isolation.

How to Use the Five Tests

  1. Customer first. Put comparable sales, traffic or retention next to two or three competitors you named in advance. Absolute growth doesn’t count.
  2. Strip the headline. List every gain, write-down, depreciation reset and restatement, then recompute operating margin without them.
  3. Trace the cash. Separate operating cash from inventory release, payables stretch, deferred taxes and disposal proceeds.
  4. Check reinvestment. Compare maintenance capital spending with the company’s own history and with peers, adjusting for expansion.
  5. Wait two periods. Hold the applause until the gains survive two annual periods after the transition.

For the same discipline applied to other cases on this site, see Xerox 2000–2003: Three Bridges Before You Call It a Turnaround, Gerstner’s First Three Years: Grade the Decisions, Not the Legend, When the Growth Denominator Shrinks, Stop Trusting the Ratio and J.C. Penney Fiscal 2012: A Market Slump, or a Company That Left Its Customers?.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was Kmart profitable after bankruptcy?

Yes, on a reported basis. Kmart Holding reported net income of $1,106 million in fiscal 2004. About 52% of it came from after-tax gains on property sales, and adjusted operating income excluding those gains was $875 million, or 4.4% of sales.

Why did Kmart’s comparable-store sales fall while profit rose?

The company cut promotions and advertising, closed stores and reduced inventory, which lowered costs faster than sales fell. It also reported lost market share to competitors that kept opening stores.

What is the difference between a turnaround and a financial rebound?

A financial rebound improves profit or cash through cost cuts, asset sales, working-capital release or accounting effects. A turnaround also shows customers returning relative to competitors, enough reinvestment to stay competitive, and gains that last after the transition.

Limits

This is a reconstruction from public filings, read from outside the company. Kmart’s fresh-start accounting makes the predecessor and successor periods not directly comparable, and the company declined to combine them. The peer set is two retailers Kmart itself named, both expanding, so capital-spending comparisons overstate the gap. Target’s filed annual report text describes comparable-store sales growth without stating the percentage. The fiscal 2005–2007 figures are Sears Holdings segment results, not standalone Kmart accounts. Percentages are my calculations from the filed figures. No executive is graded and nothing here describes anyone’s motives. This is educational analysis, not investment advice.

Run the Test on Your Own Business

  • Book Todd to speak: boards and leadership teams can bring this evidence-first approach to turnaround claims into the room. toddhagopian.com/speaking
  • Read the books: Stagnation Assassin, plus the forthcoming 10-Minute Transformation (Koehler Books, February 23, 2027). toddhagopian.com/book/
  • Free tool: find out whether your business is an ATM or a money pit with the ATM Test Scorecard.
  • Want to read 10-Minute Transformation before launch? Join the launch team.

Sources

  1. Kmart Holding Corporation, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 26, 2005: Selected Financial Data (sales, comparable sales, net income, capital expenditures, stores, fiscal 2000–2004); MD&A executive summary, results of operations, adjusted operating income, cash flows, letter-of-credit and self-insurance collateral, credit facility termination; Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows. SEC EDGAR
  2. Kmart Holding Corporation, Form 10-K/A (Amendment No. 1) for the fiscal year ended January 28, 2004, filed February 11, 2005: explanatory note and restated results (convertible note, EITF 00-27, $22 million interest charge). SEC EDGAR
  3. Kmart Holding Corporation, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 28, 2004, as originally filed March 18, 2004 (39-week net income $248 million before restatement). SEC EDGAR
  4. Sears Holdings Corporation, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended February 2, 2008: Kmart segment results fiscal 2005–2007 (sales, gross margin, selling and administrative, depreciation, gains, restructuring, operating income, stores) and MD&A comparable-store sales discussion. SEC EDGAR
  5. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 31, 2005, Exhibit 13 (net sales, U.S. comparative store sales, depreciation and amortization, payments for property and equipment). SEC EDGAR
  6. Target Corporation, Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 29, 2005, Exhibit 13 (sales growth and drivers, depreciation and amortization, expenditures for property and equipment). SEC EDGAR
  7. Constance L. Hays, “Kmart: Rich in Cash and Real Estate but Not in Sales,” The New York Times, August 20, 2004. nytimes.com
  8. “Kmart to acquire Sears in $11 billion deal,” NBC News, November 17, 2004 (third-quarter results and share-price context). nbcnews.com
  9. Todd Hagopian, 10-Minute Transformation, Chapter 2, “The Three Velocity Metrics” (relative growth; one-time distortions and multi-year trend) and Chapter 12 (optimizing the present at the expense of the future; documented decision rationale). Koehler Books, forthcoming February 23, 2027. Paraphrased, not quoted.

Calculations are mine, from the filed figures cited. Share-price and news references are context only, not evidence of operating performance. Educational analysis only.

About the Author

Todd Hagopian is VP of Product Strategy and Marketing and a business transformation author, speaker, and executive. His research is available as SSRN preprints. He is the author of the Turnaround Code Trilogy: The Unfair Advantage, Stagnation Assassin, and 10-Minute Transformation (February 23, 2027). More about Stagnation Assassins: About.