Xerox 2000–2003: Three Bridges Before You Call It a Turnaround

Stagnation Slaughters. Strategy Saves. Speed Scales.

Scope: Xerox Corporation, fiscal years 2000 through 2003, rebuilt from the company’s own SEC filings. Those are the annual reports on Form 10-K for 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003, the 2001 amendments, and the restatement tables inside them. The SEC’s April 11, 2002 litigation release covers the regulatory side. This is an accounting and cash reconstruction, not a biography and not a CEO grade (the grade is withheld; see the box near the end). Evidence cutoff: Xerox’s FY2003 Form 10-K (filed February 27, 2004) and its June 2004 amendment, plus CFO.com’s October 2003 report as independent context. All dollar figures are in millions unless noted.

Every famous turnaround gets told as a before-and-after: a company on the edge in 2000, a recovered one by 2003. Xerox is usually told that way too. But the “before” numbers in that story were rewritten twice, and the “after” numbers carry some of the revenue that was moved out of the “before.” So if you line up the headline figures and call the difference a turnaround, you’re mixing three different things.

Here’s the question worth answering for any director or CFO looking at a recovery after a restatement: how much of the improvement came from new money, how much from new accounting, and how much from a business that actually runs better? Xerox’s filings let you build all three bridges. Most retellings build none.

Bottom line: The financing bridge is the biggest and the easiest to see. Xerox drew its entire $7.0 billion credit line in late 2000, sold assets, and moved customer financing to lenders like GE. Then a June 2003 recapitalization of $3.6 billion replaced bank debt with bonds and equity. The accounting bridge is real too. The restatement cut 1997–2001 pre-tax income by $1,411 in total and pushed an estimated $1,370 of revenue into 2002 and 2003. The operating bridge is the narrowest, but it’s genuine. Gross margin rose from 37.4% to 42.0–42.4%, and spending on selling, administration and R&D fell faster than revenue. Revenue never grew, though: it fell every year from 2000 to 2003, and 2003’s 1% decline would have been about 6% without currency.

Verdict: by 2003 Xerox was solvent, refinanced and more profitable per dollar of revenue. Durable operating repair wasn’t proven inside this window, because the top line was still shrinking in constant currency and part of the reported revenue was a restatement tail. No CEO grade is assigned.

How to read the labels: [Fact] is a figure from a filing or a regulator’s document. [Company assertion] is management’s explanation, estimate or forecast in those filings. [Regulatory allegation] is what the SEC alleged; Xerox settled without admitting or denying it. [Analyst interpretation] is a named third party’s view. [Inference] is my reading of the numbers, and you should check it. The calculations are mine, from the cited tables.

First, Fix the Baseline: Which 2000 Are You Comparing Against?

[Fact] Xerox’s 2000 annual report was filed on June 7, 2001, months late, and it already restated 1998 and 1999. Then, on April 11, 2002, the SEC filed a civil fraud action against the company. Xerox settled the same day.

[Regulatory allegation] According to SEC Litigation Release No. 17465, the complaint alleged that from at least 1997 through 2000, Xerox used undisclosed accounting actions, most of which violated GAAP, that accelerated equipment revenue recognition by over $3 billion and increased pre-tax earnings by approximately $1.5 billion. Most of the alleged actions involved how revenue from bundled leases was split between the equipment (booked up front) and service and financing (booked over the life of the lease). The two largest, which Xerox internally called “return on equity” and “margin normalization,” are alleged to have added $2.8 billion of equipment revenue and $660 million of pre-tax earnings from 1997 to 2000.

[Fact] The settlement terms are a separate matter from the allegations. Without admitting or denying the allegations, Xerox consented to a permanent injunction. It agreed to pay a $10 million civil penalty, to restate 1997 through 2000, and to have a committee of outside directors review its material accounting controls. The SEC said its investigation was continuing “as it relates to other parties.” This article draws no conclusion about any individual.

[Fact] The restatement arrived with the 2001 10-K, filed June 28, 2002. It moved revenue between periods rather than erasing most of it. Here is the company’s own bridge:

Year Revenue, previously reported Revenue, restated Change Pre-tax income, previously reported Pre-tax income, restated Change
1997 $18,225 $17,457 −$768 $2,005 $1,287 −$718
1998 $19,593 $18,777 −$816 $579 −$13 −$592
1999 $19,567 $18,995 −$572 $1,908 $1,288 −$620
2000 $18,701 $18,751 +$50 −$384 −$367 +$17
2001 $16,502 $17,008 +$506 −$137 $365 +$502
1997–2001 −$1,600 −$1,411

Source: Xerox 2001 Annual Report (Exhibit 13 to the 2001 Form 10-K), MD&A restatement tables. “Previously reported” for 1997–2000 means the figures as reported after the 2001 restatement of 1998–1999. For 2001 it means the results Xerox first announced, before the 10-K. Totals are my sums.

[Fact] Underneath that table, the restatement cut equipment sales revenue by $585 to $1,672 a year, about $6.5 billion across the five years by my sum. CFO.com reported the figure as $6.4 billion. Most of that was reallocated to service, rental and financing revenue, recognized over the life of the leases rather than up front. The company said about $1.9 billion of revenue recognized in 2001 and earlier had been reversed, and estimated it would be recognized as $800 in 2002, $570 in 2003 and $530 thereafter ([Company assertion], estimate). The restated sales gross margin for 2000 dropped from 37.5% to 31.2%.

[Inference] That’s the first trap. Restated 2001 revenue is higher than first announced, because revenue pulled out of 1997–1999 landed partly in 2001. Measure 2002 against the announced 2001 and revenue fell 4.0%. Measure it against restated 2001 and it fell 6.8%. And 2002 and 2003 each carry a company-estimated slice of earlier years’ revenue, about 5% and 3.6% of their totals. The accounting change shifted revenue into later years, and the “after” period received part of it.

Then It Moved Again

Xerox’s 2001 result, three versions Total revenue Net income (loss)
As first announced (before the 10-K) $16,502 −$293
2001 Form 10-K, June 28, 2002 (restated/revised) $17,008 −$71
10-K/A Amendment No. 5, January 2003 $17,008 −$94

[Fact] The third version exists because, in December 2002, Xerox found an error in how it calculated 2001 interest expense on a debt instrument and related interest-rate swaps under the new derivatives standard (SFAS 133). That understated interest expense by $34 and overstated a debt-extinguishment gain by $3. It’s small, but it matters for governance. It came after the settlement and after a new auditor (PricewaterhouseCoopers) had re-audited 2000 and 2001. CFO.com reported that analysts had been told the company had put its problems behind it, and that an S&P equity analyst stayed cautious because of the surprise ([Analyst interpretation]).

Todd’s forthcoming 10-Minute Transformation makes a related point in Chapter 2 (“The Three Velocity Metrics”). When a one-time charge or an accounting adjustment distorts a year, don’t read that year on its own. Strip the item out if you can identify it, and anchor on the multi-year trend. A restatement is that warning at full scale: the trend itself has to be rebuilt before you can read it. Everything below uses the latest restated figures, from the FY2002 and FY2003 annual reports.

Bridge 1: Financing Relief Bought Time, Not Proof

[Fact] In the 2000 annual report, Xerox said capital markets and uncommitted bank lines had been “largely unavailable” since October 2000, after several rating downgrades. In the fourth quarter of 2000 it drew down the entire $7.0 billion revolving credit facility. At year-end, $5.6 billion of that was used and $1.4 billion sat in cash. The revolver’s only financial covenant was a minimum tangible net worth of $3.2 billion, and Xerox was $600 above it.

[Fact] The October 2000 Turnaround Program, as described in the 2001 annual report, had four parts. They were $2 to $4 billion of asset sales; cost reductions of at least $1 billion a year; moving equipment financing to third-party lenders; and a focus on the core document business. By the end of 2002 the company reported about $2.7 billion of asset sales and about $1.7 billion of annualized cost reductions ([Company assertion] for the annualized savings figure).

Year-end / full year 2000 2001 2002 2003
Cash and equivalents $1,750 $3,990 $2,887 $2,477
Total debt $18,637 $16,744 $14,171 $11,166
Plus: liabilities to trusts issuing preferred securities (not in total debt) $721 $1,787 $1,793 $1,809
Debt secured by finance receivables n/d n/d $3,900 $4,425
Proceeds from divestitures $640 $1,768 $340 $35
New secured financings, less repayments −$121 +$1,350 +$1,393 +$269
Equity and preferred stock issued for cash — $28 $4 $1,366

Sources: five-year summary and cash-flow statements, Xerox 2003 Annual Report (2001–2003) and 2002 Annual Report (2000). n/d = not disclosed on the same basis in the reports reviewed. Equity in 2003 = $889 mandatory convertible preferred + $477 common.

[Inference] Read that table from the bottom up. In 2001, the big cash came from selling half of the Fuji Xerox stake ($1,283, per the 2001 report) and other assets, plus a $1,004 loan from trusts that issued preferred securities. That’s why total debt fell $1,893 in 2001 while the trust-preferred line rose $1,066: some of the debt reduction was a change of label, not a change of burden. In 2002, the new money came from secured borrowing against customer lease receivables, mostly from GE. The company said almost half its finance receivables were securitized by the end of 2002, and about 60% were pledged by the end of 2003. In 2003, it came from shareholders.

[Fact] The June 2002 “New Credit Facility” replaced the old $7.0 billion revolver. Xerox permanently repaid $2.8 billion at signing. At December 31, 2002, $3.5 billion was outstanding, with no unused capacity, under term loans amortizing through 2005. The June 2003 recapitalization raised $3.6 billion in common stock, mandatory convertible preferred, 7- and 10-year senior notes, and a new $1 billion credit facility. The company said this cut debt by $1.6 billion and raised equity by $1.3 billion, and that the new facility’s interest rate was about 2 percentage points lower. All of the old bank facility was repaid.

[Inference] Here’s why the financing bridge proves less than it looks. Total debt fell from $18,637 to $11,166, but $4,425 of the 2003 balance is matched against lease receivables that customers are paying down. The debt that isn’t tied to receivables went from $10,271 at the end of 2002 to $6,741 at the end of 2003. That’s a major improvement, but a large share of it was paid for with new equity and preferred stock, not operating cash. Lenders and investors coming back in 2003 is evidence of their confidence. It isn’t evidence that the copier business had been fixed. CFO.com’s S&P analyst made a similar distinction: he said the SEC matter and the restructuring were “basically two separate things” ([Analyst interpretation]).

Bridge 2: Operating Cash Is Flattered by a Shrinking Loan Book

Cash flow item 2000 2001 2002 2003
Net cash from operating activities $207 $1,754 $1,980 $1,879
Of which: decrease (increase) in finance receivables −$701 +$88 +$754 +$496
Operating cash excluding finance-receivable change $908 $1,666 $1,226 $1,383
Capital spending + internal-use software $663 $343 $196 $250
Cash restructuring payments (inside operating cash) −$387 −$484 −$392 −$345
Pension contributions (inside operating cash) n/d −$42 −$138 −$672

Sources: cash-flow statements, 2003 Annual Report (2001–2003) and 2002 Annual Report (2000). The 2003 report reclassified some prior-year lines. On the 2002 report’s basis, operating cash was $1,566 for 2001 and $1,876 for 2002. The 2000 column uses the 2002 report’s basis.

[Fact] The 2002 annual report credits operating cash flow of $1.9 billion as part of strengthening the balance sheet. [Inference] In a leasing business, a shrinking book of customer receivables releases cash that shows up in the operating section. In 2002, $754 of the $1,980 came from that, as fewer new leases were written and more financing went to third parties. Take it out and operating cash fell from 2001 to 2002. It then improved in 2003, even after a $672 pension contribution that the company chose to accelerate. That’s the better signal of where cash generation was heading. It’s still a mixed signal, because capital spending was also cut to about a third of its 2000 level.

Bridge 3: The Operating Repair Is Real but Narrow

Restated results 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total revenue $18,751 $17,008 $15,849 $15,701
Change vs. prior year −9.3% −6.8% −0.9%
Gross margin (after equipment financing interest) 37.4% 38.2% 42.4% 42.0%
Research and development $1,064 (5.7%) $997 (5.9%) $917 (5.8%) $868 (5.5%)
Selling, administrative and general $5,518 (29.4%) $4,728 (27.8%) $4,437 (28.0%) $4,249 (27.1%)
Gross profit less R&D and SAG $438 (2.3%) $776 (4.6%) $1,367 (8.6%) $1,475 (9.4%)
Restructuring and asset impairment charges $475 $715 $670 $176
Large one-time gains (−) and litigation provision (+) −$221 (China sale, affiliate stock) −$777 (half of Fuji Xerox stake, affiliate stock) — +$239 litigation, −$13 affiliate stock
Net income (loss) −$273 −$94 $91 $360
Employees at year-end 91,500 78,900 67,800 61,100

Sources: income statements and five-year summary, 2003 Annual Report (2001–2003) and 2002 Annual Report (2000). “Gross profit less R&D and SAG” is my subtotal. It excludes restructuring, one-time gains, the litigation provision and “other expenses, net” (which includes non-financing interest), so it isn’t a reported Xerox measure. Percentages are of total revenue. The 2001 annual report gives about 92,500 employees at the end of 2000; the 2003 five-year table shows 91,500.

[Inference] Three things in that table are genuine operating repair, and the filings back each of them. First, gross margin rose about 5 points from 2000 to 2002 and held in 2003. That’s what Todd’s Chapter 2 calls a profit-velocity reading, the direction of unit economics. It moved the right way, and it held for two years, not one. Second, selling, administrative and general expense fell $1,269 (23%) while revenue fell $3,050 (16%). Third, the core subtotal went from about 2% of revenue to more than 9%. A company that does that while its revenue shrinks has taken real cost out of how it operates.

But look at what’s missing. [Fact] Revenue fell every year. The 2003 annual report says the 1% decline in 2003 included a 5-point benefit from currency. Equipment sales grew 7% that year, but 6 points of that was currency. Post-sale revenue (service, supplies, rentals, the annuity that pays for a copier business) fell 4% even with a 5-point currency tailwind. The company said that reflected fewer machines in the field. [Inference] In constant currency, 2003 revenue fell about 6%. Some of the reported revenue in 2002 and 2003 was also the restatement tail. The company estimated that tail would shrink by $230 from 2002 to 2003, which is more than reported revenue fell ($148). I can’t reconcile that precisely, because the filings I reviewed don’t report the actual amount recognized each year. But it rules out reading 2003 as the year the top line turned.

Todd’s book offers a test that doesn’t work here, and the reason is instructive. Flow-through, the share of each extra revenue dollar that reaches operating profit, can’t be read from these years, because there were no extra revenue dollars. Revenue fell while profit rose, so the ratio comes out negative and means nothing. The Chapter 2 flow-through section warns about exactly this: a flat or falling revenue base makes the one-year ratio unreliable. [Inference] When the denominator is shrinking, the honest question is simpler. Did costs fall faster than revenue, and will they stay down once revenue has to grow? Xerox answered the first question by 2003. The second needed later years.

On R&D: if you’ve read that Xerox protected research spending through the cuts, the filings support a narrower version. [Fact] Reported R&D expense fell from $1,064 in 2000 to $868 in 2003 (−18%), while staying between 5.5% and 5.9% of revenue. The company’s own explanations are specific. The 2001 decline was mainly the exit from small office/home office products. For 2002, it cited the same exit, restructuring savings and outside funding, plus an accounting adjustment to ESOP compensation. For 2003, about $30 of the decline came from the DocuColor iGen3 moving from development to commercial launch. It also says R&D was coordinated with Fuji Xerox, which spent $724 in 2003 ([Company assertion]). [Inference] So “R&D held its share of revenue and was reprioritized” is supported. “No R&D dollars were cut” is not, at least not for the reported total.

What Management Knew, and When

  • May 2000. [Fact] According to the 2000 10-K, a new chairman/CEO and president/COO team (Anne Mulcahy was the president and COO) “began work stabilizing the business.” Mulcahy became CEO in August 2001, as CFO.com reported, and is listed as chairman and CEO in the 2001 10-K. The October 2000 program was announced while she was president and COO, before she became CEO.
  • October 2000. [Fact] The Turnaround Program was announced while the capital markets were effectively closed. At that point, management couldn’t have known what the restated history would look like. The SEC investigation was open, and the company’s own restatement of 1998–1999 hadn’t been filed.
  • June 2001. [Fact] The 2000 10-K was filed late with 1998–1999 restated. Moody’s rated Xerox’s senior debt Ba1, below investment grade (as of May 29, 2001).
  • April–June 2002. [Fact] The SEC settlement came first. It was followed by the 2001 10-K with the full 1997–2001 restatement, and by the new credit agreement.
  • December 2002–January 2003. [Fact] Xerox found the interest-expense error and restated 2001 again.
  • March 2003. [Fact, per CFO.com] CalPERS put Xerox at the top of its governance focus list, calling it one of the “most ineffective boards.” The company added an independent director.
  • June 2003. [Fact] The recapitalization was completed and the 2002 bank facility repaid.

[Inference] The most useful pattern here is the sequence. The liquidity decisions in October 2000 had to be made before the accounting was settled, and they didn’t depend on it. Selling assets, drawing the revolver and moving financing to lenders all generate cash whatever the true historical margin turns out to be. That matches what Todd calls decision velocity: on cash, a fast decision that’s roughly right beats a slow one that’s fully informed. It’s an interpretation of the record, not a claim about the method anyone at Xerox used. The decisions that did depend on accurate accounting couldn’t be judged until mid-2002. Those included which products and regions were really profitable and how big the lease book really was.

Stakeholder Costs, Stated Plainly

[Fact] Year-end employment fell from 91,500 to 61,100 between 2000 and 2003. Not all of that was layoffs. About 2,500 employees in 2001 and 1,600 in early 2002 transferred to Flextronics with the office manufacturing operations, and the small office/home office business was exited. The common dividend went from $0.65 a share in 2000 to $0.05 in 2001 and nothing in 2002 and 2003. Shareholders were diluted by 46 million new common shares and a mandatory convertible preferred issue in 2003. Xerox also recorded a $239 litigation provision in 2003 for the court-approved settlement of a retirement-plan lawsuit (Berger v. Retirement Income Guarantee Plan). The year-end share price was $22.69 in 1999, $4.63 in 2000 and $13.80 in 2003. That’s context, not evidence of operating repair.

Disconfirming evidence: what would prove this read wrong

  • If the restatement tail was much smaller in practice than the company’s June 2002 estimate, then more of 2002–2003 revenue was organic, and the top line was closer to stabilizing than I’ve said.
  • If constant-currency post-sale revenue (the installed-base annuity) stopped falling soon after 2003, the 2003 equipment growth was the start of a real recovery and not just currency.
  • If the gross-margin gain came mainly from mix, such as exiting low-margin products and regions, rather than lasting productivity, it could fade once the mix stopped improving. The 2003 margin slipped 0.4 points, and the company cited price declines of about 5–10% in its main product lines.
  • The other way around: if a peer copier and printer group on the same basis improved its margins just as much over 2000–2003, much of Xerox’s operating gain was the industry cycle, not anything company-specific. This article doesn’t run that peer comparison.

Credible alternative explanation: much of the reported profit recovery could be mechanical. It could come from exiting a loss-making product line, running off a finance book, a weaker dollar in 2003, and revenue arriving from the restatement, with genuine cost productivity a smaller share than the headline implies. The filings separate some of these effects but not all, so the split can’t be pinned down from outside the company.

Why there’s no CEO grade

Under the fixed rubric Stagnation Assassins uses for leadership grades, a grade requires at least 85% weighted coverage, with operating economics, cash and governance all evidenced. Here, operating economics is N/A: profit evidence exists, but independent customer-outcome evidence doesn’t, and half an anchor doesn’t count. Institutional durability is N/A, because the window ends in 2003. Only cash and capital, strategy against commitments, and governance can be assessed, which is 60% coverage. Leadership also changed partway through the window, and the program predates the CEO appointment. No peer set was built. Grade withheld.

The Director’s Checklist: Three Bridges for Any Post-Restatement Recovery

  • Freeze the baseline. Write down which version of the “before” year you’re using: as first reported, as restated once, or as restated again. Compare restated to restated, and footnote the tail of revenue the restatement moved into the “after” years.
  • Separate the money from the business. List every source of cash by type: asset sales, secured borrowing, new equity, operating cash. Debt that falls because a trust-preferred instrument or a receivables lender replaced it hasn’t fallen, just moved.
  • Strip the loan book out of operating cash. In any company that finances its customers, a shrinking receivables book releases cash that looks like operating performance.
  • Read margins on a falling revenue line with care. Margin direction and cost-versus-revenue speed work. Flow-through doesn’t, because there’s no growth to divide by.
  • Restate in constant currency before you call the top line. In 2003, currency was worth 5 points of Xerox’s revenue change.
  • Keep allegations, settlements and conclusions on separate lines. An SEC complaint is an allegation. A settlement without admission is a settlement. Neither one tells you who did what.

For the same evidence-first method applied to a full rubric grade, read Gerstner’s First Three Years: Grade the Decisions, Not the Legend. For a current-quarter version of the perimeter problem, see Starbucks’ Oct 29 Results: Traffic, Ticket, and the China Accounting Bridge. For a crisis-week action list, see Crisis Mode Checklist: 30 Turnaround Actions, and for building these bridges into a dashboard, Measuring Transformation Progress: KPIs, Milestones, and Success Metrics.

Limits

This is a reconstruction from public filings, read from outside the company. Figures use the latest restated presentation available in the FY2002 and FY2003 annual reports. Where those reports differ (some 2001–2002 cash-flow lines were reclassified in the 2003 report, and pre-tax income was presented differently after a change in how trust-preferred costs were classified), I’ve said which basis each table uses. I found no actual, as-opposed-to-estimated, figure for restatement-tail revenue recognized in 2002 or 2003 in the passages reviewed. No peer comparison is made. No claim is made about the motives, knowledge or conduct of any individual beyond what the cited documents state. This is educational analysis, not investment or legal advice.

Run the Test on Your Own Business

  • Book Todd to speak: boards and leadership teams can bring this evidence-first approach to turnarounds into the room. toddhagopian.com/speaking
  • Read the books: Stagnation Assassin, plus the forthcoming 10-Minute Transformation (Koehler Books, February 23, 2027), where the three velocity metrics are laid out in full. toddhagopian.com/book/
  • Free tool: find out whether your business is an ATM or a money pit with the ATM Test Scorecard.
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Sources

  1. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Litigation Release No. 17465 / Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1542, “Xerox Settles SEC Enforcement Action Charging Company with Fraud, Agrees to Pay $10 Million Fine, Restate Its Financial Results and Conduct Special Review of Its Accounting Controls,” April 11, 2002. SEC
  2. Xerox Corporation, Form 10-K for fiscal 2000 (filed June 7, 2001), including the 2000 Annual Report (Exhibit 13): liquidity, revolver drawdown, Turnaround Program, 1998–1999 restatement. SEC EDGAR
  3. Xerox Corporation, Form 10-K for fiscal 2001 (filed June 28, 2002), 2001 Annual Report (Exhibit 13): restatement tables, revenue-deferral estimates, Turnaround Program progress, R&D, employment. SEC EDGAR
  4. Xerox Corporation, Form 10-K/A Amendment No. 5 for fiscal 2001 (January 2003): restatement of 2001 interest expense. SEC EDGAR
  5. Xerox Corporation, Form 10-K for fiscal 2002 (filed March 31, 2003), 2002 Annual Report (Exhibit 13): income and cash-flow statements, New Credit Facility, R&D. SEC EDGAR
  6. Xerox Corporation, Form 10-K for fiscal 2003 (filed February 27, 2004), 2003 Annual Report (Exhibit 13): five-year summary, recapitalization, secured debt and finance receivables, currency effects, litigation provision. SEC EDGAR. The June 30, 2004 Form 10-K/A adds Fuji Xerox financial statements only.
  7. Craig Schneider, “Xerox: New Lease on Life,” CFO.com, October 24, 2003 (restatement size, December 2002 correction, analyst views, CalPERS, CEO date). CFO.com
  8. Todd Hagopian, 10-Minute Transformation, Chapter 2, “The Three Velocity Metrics” (profit velocity one-time-item caution; flow-through denominator warning). Koehler Books, forthcoming February 23, 2027. Paraphrased, not quoted.

Calculations are mine, from the filed figures cited. “Previously reported” follows the company’s own usage in its 2001 restatement tables. Percentages are rounded. Educational analysis only.

About the Author

Todd Hagopian is VP of Product Strategy and Marketing and a business transformation author, speaker, and executive. His research is available as SSRN preprints. He is the author of the Turnaround Code Trilogy: The Unfair Advantage, Stagnation Assassin, and 10-Minute Transformation (February 23, 2027). More about Stagnation Assassins: About.